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Premenstrual Tension In Automobile
Accidents
Naoma Lee Stewart*
66flART-TIME WrrclIEs" was the picturesque description of
I. many women used by Dr. Erie Henriksen, head of the
University of Southern California Department of Gynecology.
He was describing women suffering from premenstrual tension.'
Speaking at the annual Congress of the American College of
Surgeons held October, 1956, in San Francisco, Dr. Henriksen
said that he and his colleagues estimate that about one-half of
all their women patients between the age of thirty and meno-
pause suffer from periodic witchiness.2
Although it has been known for many years that approxi-
mately fifty percent of women suffer mental and physical dis-
tress during the premenstrual fortnight, little attention has been
paid to this problem except in extremely severe instances.3 Only
in 1931 was the first paper on the subject written by Robert T.
Frank,4 pioneer endocrinologic gynecologist, who indicated the
scientific existence of premenstrual tension and attributed its
cause to hormonal imbalance. Since Frank's article there has
been a widespread interest in the causation and treatment of
this common syndrome. Howard L. Oleck, then a law professor
at New York Law School and now of Cleveland-Marshall Law
School, in 1953 first suggested that this scientific phenomenon
must have far-reaching legal effects.
With the increased knowledge of premenstrual tension and
its acceptance as a settled scientific fact comes the inescapable
conclusion that novel legal problems are posed as to the criminal
and civil responsibility of women suffering from this involun-
tary dysfunction. The realistic student of law readily appre-
ciates that the law cannot be pure philosophy completely di-
* B. A., Western Michigai College of Education & L. Arts, and a Second
Year Student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
I The significance of Premenstrual Tension as a legal fact was originally
suggested by H'ard L. Oletk, in, Legal Aspects of Premer tral Tension,
166 Intnatl. Record of Medicine, 492-501 (1953).
2 Time Magazine-Medichie, p. 71 (October 22, 1956).
3 Morton, J. H., A Clinical Study of Premenstrual Tension1, 65 Amer. J.
Obst. & Gynec., 1182 (195).
4 Frank, R. T., Hormonal Cases of Premenstrual Tension, 26 Arch. Neurol.,
& Psychiat., 1053 (1931).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1957
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
vorced from the scientific facts of life. "Most modern legal
realists understand that law is largely a somewhat tardy philo-
sophic synthesis of rules based on general acceptance of scien-
tific and social conclusions."
In the past, the conservatism of some members of the legal
profession has often been a stubborn obstacle to the progress of
the law. It will be remembered that professional resistance by
some leading lawyers long delayed the enactment of married
women's rights legislation; nevertheless such legislation was
eventually enacted.6 It is to be anticipated that similar resist-
ance to recognition of severe premenstrual tension as a legal
fact is inevitable, despite the fact that as early as 1902 such
authorities as Krafft-Ebing 7 have urged that judges give con-
sideration to the abnormal personality changes that occur in
innumerable women at this time.
The scope of possible legal problems involved in the exist-
ence of this physical and mental dysfunction is very wide. For
the sake of brevity the writer would like to separate the dis-
cussions of criminal and civil responsibility, and make this initial
study one which is specifically limited to the civil rights and
liabilities of women involved in automobile accidents. It is em-
phasized that the effects of premenstrual tension in torts are not
as clearly pertinent as they are in crimes. But they are perti-
nent.
Before discussing the legal concepts which are applicable to
this problem, a brief description of some of the physical and
mental effects accompanying a severe case of premenstrual ten-
sion may serve a twofold purpose. First, to the unfortunate
female who is bedeviled by this common affliction, it may be a
source of comfort to know that her feeling of being strictly
broomstick material for a portion of each month has a logical
scientific explanation. Despite her fears to the contrary, gen-
erally she is not a full fledged female neurotic, but is simply
suffering from premenstrual tension. To her harassed husband,
who periodically flees to the nearest bar to growl imprecations
into his badly needed drink, it should be a source of some com-
fort to know that his plight is not unique. Despite his convic-
tions to the contrary, he personally did not corner the market
5 Oleck, H. L., Legal Aspects of Premenstrual Tension, 166 Intnatl. Record
of Medicine, 495 (1953).
6 Ibid. Oleck, H. L.
7 Krafft-Ebing, Richard von, Psychosis Menstrualis, pp. 93-94, Stuttgart
(Ferdinand Erika Verlag, 1902).
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on unreasonable women when he took unto himself a wife. Her
irritable and irrational behavior could be caused by premen-
strual tension.
Secohdly, and more important, the primary purpose js to
acquaint the reader with mental and physical reactions which
affect a woman's standard of conduct, thereby affecting her legal
responsibilities.
In November, 1953, the International Record of Medicine
and General Practice Clinics published a detailed report of a
Symposium on Premenstrual Tension which had been held in
New York City earlier that year. The moderator of this sym-
posium was Dr. Joseph Morton of New York City, one of the
leading endocrinologists of this era. The causes, effects, and
treatment of this common syndrome were exhaustively re'iewed
by outstanding men in the fields of Gynecology, Obstetrics, En-
docrinology, and Psychiatry. In addition to the medical aspects,
a comprehensive discussion of the legal aspects of premenstrual
tension was presented by Howard L. Oleck. It was repeatedly
pointed out that women suffering from the severest symptoms
of premenstrual tension are afflicted with physical and emotional
changes so profound that their entire patterns of behavior fre-
quently became irrational, uncontrolled, and completely un-
dependable.
"Whenever the monthly tension reaches its maximum height,
the manic activity of the patient beggars description. The physi-
cal unrest, causeless irritability, hairtrigger temper, insomnia,
vertigo, and headaches, in addition to recurring episodes of de-
pression and hebetude, tax the endurance of both the patient
and her family. A weight gain of from 4 to 6 pounds is not
unusual during the time of the symptoms. Occasionally, pre-
menstrual tension is dramatized by nymphomania8 or ulcerative
stomatitis,9 either of which may be the only important com-
plaint. As with any clinical entity not all of the symptoms may
be present in a single patient. Most frequent, however, is the
periodic and spectacular alteration of personality, taking in
general the form of either recurrent frenzy or catonic-like de-
pression.' '0
8 Israel, S. L., Premenstrual Tension, 110 J. A. M. A., 1721 (1938).
9 Ziserman, A. J., Ulcerative Vulvitis and Stomatitis of Endocrine Origin,
104 J. A. M. A., 826 (1935).
10 Israel, S. L., The Clinical Patiern and Etiology of Premenstrual Tension,
166 Intnatl. Rec. of Med. & Genl. Pract. Clinics, 470 (Nov. 1953).
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There is still a diversity of opinion as to the precise causes
of all the physical and emotional effects which are manifested
premenstrually. Many women are painfully aware of severe
headaches (comparable to migraine), abdominal bloating, breast
engorgement, blurred vision, and an unexplained weight increase,
without knowing that this is a premenstrual syndrome which
results from abnormal fluid retention. Unfortunately, the specific
physiological mechanism that produces this abnormal fluid re-
tention is still not clear." Generally speaking, it has been at-
tributed to the sodium retaining property of the sex hormones,'1 2
to the action of the posterior pituitary through the antidiuretic
hormone' s and conceivably to defective mineralocorticoid ac-
tion.' 4 The fluid is thought to be retained primarily in the extra-
cellular spaces, but a certain amount may be retained intercel-
lularly.1
5
With treatment by any of the new mercurial diuretics the
patient suffering from abnormal fluid retention has received
dramatic relief from many of her most painful symptoms. The
best guess as to why draining off of excess water improves the
emotional state is the fact that when the extracellular tissues of
the body retain water so does the brain.
While the abnormal retention of fluid has long been con-
ceded to be a cause of the premenstrual syndrome, one new
finding independently discovered by Harris, Billig, and Morton
deserves particular elaboration. This finding is spontaneous
hypoglycemia.
Hypoglycemia is a condition produced by the lowering of the
blood sugar values below the normal level. This lowered level
usually presents signs and symptoms that vary proportionately
with the degree of fall and with individual sensitivity to this
fact. The signs and symptoms resemble in all details the effects
11 Morton, J. H., Treatment of Premenstrual Tension, 166 Intnatl. Record
of Medicine, 11 (Nov., 1953).
12 Greenhill, J. P. & Freed, S. C., Electrolyte Therapy of Premenstrual
Distress, 117 J. A. M. A., 504; Thorn, G. W.; Nelson, K. R. & Thorn, G. W.,
A Study of the Mechanism of Edema Associated with Menstruation, 22
Endocrinology, 155 (1938).
Is Vainder, M., Theory and Rationale in Treatment of Premenstrual Tension
and Dysmenorrhea, 20 Indus. Med. & Sur., 199-201 (1951); Vainder, M.,
New Treatment for Premenstrual Tension and Dysmenorrhea, 22 Indus.
Med. & Surg., 183-5 (1953).
14 Selye, H., Annual Report of Stress, Montreal, Canada, Acta, Inc., 1950.
15 Mulholland, J. H., The Physiology of the Adrenal Cortex, 32 Surg. Clin.
of N, A. 347-57 (1952).
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of an overdose of insulin. If the attack is mild there may be
only moderate discomfort with nervousness, weakness, trem-
bling, perspiration, apprehension, craving for foods or sweets,
nausea, abdominal pain, and speech impairment.
Major attacks may assume extremely severe proportions
with convulsions, prostration, temporary unconsciousness, and
marked mental disturbances. In extreme cases coma and death
ensue. The central nervous system's deprivation of its necessary
carbohydrate supply is responsible for the various psychic and
nervous manifestations. 16
The relation between hypoglycemia and criminology is not
a new discovery and has been thoroughly covered by Joseph
Wilder in his "Sugar Metabolism and Its Relation to Crimi-
nology." 17 Spontaneous hypoglycemia in relation to severe pre-
mentrual tension and its effect on the victim from the legal view-
point are of great interest to us here. According to Wilder some
of the principal important effects are marked "impairment of
judgment," hazy thinking "impairment of self control," loss of
association, negativism, and strengthening of aggressive drives. s
It is now known, for example, that hypoglycemia is asso-
ciated with prolonged stress. 19 Considering the legal aspects of
proof of premenstrual tension, it is of paramount interest to
note that scientific tests of sugar content of the blood would be a
matter of objective evidence which could be verified after the
event resulting in litigation, even if no previous medical record
of the hypoglycemia in relation to premenstrual tension existed.
Periodicity of recurrence of physiological changes, measurable
by scientific methods, enable charts to be drawn for many
women, clearly indicating, by objective evidence, their psycho-
somatic condition at a given past date.2 0 The legal possibilities
suggested by this fact are enormous.
At this point it might be pertinent to point out how few
women recognize the complaint from which they suffer. It
creeps up on them gradually beginning in their late twenties
and reaches a peak of severity around the age of forty. Some
16 Himerich, H. E., Brain Metabolism & Cerebral Disorders (Baltimore,
Williams, & Wilkins Co., 1951).
17 Wilder, Joseph, Sugar Metabolism in Its Relation to Criminology, in,
Lindner & Seliger, Handbook of Correctional Psychology, p. 98, New York
(Philosophical Library, 1945).
Is Ibid., Wilder, p. 98.
19 Selye, H., Annual Report on Stress, Montreal, Canada, Acta, Inc., 1951.
20 Oleck, supra, ii. 5.
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think of their premenstrual discomfort and depression as a part
of the price they must pay for womanhood. They try to dismiss
it but do not succeed, and their families suffer as a consequence.
Too many doctors have a tendency to dismiss a tense, depressed
patient with comments like "It's all in your head. . . . You're
just too nervous."
Dr. S. Charles Freed, Adjunct in Medicine, Mount Zion
Hospital, San Francisco, California, said,
"The diagnosis of this condition is quite simple. When the
question is asked of a woman 'How do you feel a few days
before your menstrual period?' the answer comes out
promptly. It is a distinct pleasure as a physician to observe
the relief and gratitude in his patients when it is explained
that this is a normal occurrence and not 'imagination' or
'neuroses.' " 21
Dr. Henriksen, in his talk before the American College of
Surgeons, commented on the failure of the average woman
suffering from premenstrual tension to recognize the cause of
her trouble. Not only does the patient not recognize the source
of her complaint, but many physicians do not properly diagnose
the problem. In 18 years, Dr. Henriksen said, he had treated
400 patients suffering from premenstrual tension; and in only
one case did the referring physician mention it as the patient's
specific complaint.22
The possible legal responsibility of a woman who has a
physical disability of which she is not consciously aware pre-
sents an interesting problem in terms of law.
In late 1953, following the publication of Professor Oleck's
paper, Dr. L. G. Balsam of California reported on a study of pre-
menstrual tension in automobile accidents. In a two year study
of 500 major automobile accidents involving women, premen-
strual tension was found to be a direct causative factor in very
many cases. Unwilling to rely on so small a study, he pointed
out its startling statistical conclusions, and urged further research
on premenstrual tension by the National Research Counsel Com-
mittee on Highway Safety. 23 As to this, see the discussion below,
especially after note 43.
21 Freed, C. S., History & Causation of Premenstrual Tension, 166 Intnatl.
Rec. of Med. & Genl. Prac. Clin., 467 (1953).
22 Henriksen, Erie, Time Magazine, p. 71, October 22, 1956.
23 Balsam, Women's Periodic Driving Danger, 11 Women's Life (4) 71
(Fall, 1953); and see, Greenblatt, Premenstrual Tension Syndrome, 11 G. P.,
66 (1955).
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To establish legal liability of a woman driver who has be-
come involved in an automobile accident, the proximate cause
of which accident is her temporary physical disability resulting
from a severe case of premenstrual tension, of course it is neces-
sary to prove that the woman driver is guilty of negligence.
Negligence is defined as "conduct which falls below the stand-
ard established by law for the protection of others against un-
reasonably great risk of harm." 24
The idea of risk necessarily involves a recognizable danger.
This, in turn, rests upon some knowledge or duty to know of the
existing facts, and some reasonable duty to know that harm
may follow. 25 A risk is a danger which is apparent, or should be
apparent, to one in the position of the actor. The culpability of
the actor's conduct must be judged in the light of the possibili-
ties apparent to him at the time, and not by looking backward
"with the wisdom born of the event." 26 It is not enough that
everyone can see now that the risk was great, if it was not ap-
parent when the conduct occurred. 27 The court must put itself
in the actor's place. At the same time the standard fixed must
be an external one, based upon what society demands of the
individual rather than upon his own notion of what is proper.
In the light of the recognizable risk, the conduct in order
to be negligent, must be unreasonable. Nearly all human acts
carry some remote possibility of harm, and no person theoreti-
cally so much as drives an automobile without some chance of
an accident. The risks aganst which the actor is required to
guard are those which society recognizes as sufficiently great to
demand precaution. No person can be expected to guard against
events which are not reasonably to be anticipated. On the other
hand, if the risk is an appreciable one, and the possible conse-
quences are serious, the question is not one of strictly mathe-
matical probability.
Against this probability of the risk must be balanced in
every case the necessity and utility of the type of conduct in
question. Consideration must also be given to the inconvenience
and the cost of any alternative course open to the actor.
24 Restatement ot Torts, See. 2%2.
25 Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective, 41 Harv. L. R. 1, 5-?
(1927).
26 Cardozo, C. J., in Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 257 N. Y. 190,
177 N. E. 416 (1931).
27 "Nothing is so easy as to be wise after the event." Bramwell, B., in
Cornman v. Eastern Counties R. Co., 1859, 4 H. & N. 781, 786.
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It is fundamental that the standard of conduct which is the
basis of the law of negligence is determined by balancing the
risk and the probability and extent of harm, against the value
of the interest which the actor is seeking to protect.28 For this
reason, it is seldom possible to reduce negligence to precisely
definite rules. It is "relative to the need of the occasion." 29 In
negligence, it is considered that no wrong at all has occurred
unless the defendant's conduct has been unreasonable in the
light of the risk, and the burden is upon the plaintiff from the
outset to establish this fact.
What is this standard of conduct which is the basis of the
law of negligence? The standard of conduct required of an in-
dividual is the supposed conduct of the law's most famous
fictitious person, the reasonable man of ordinary prudence.
"This excellent but odious character stands like a monument in
our Courts of Justice, vainly appealing to his fellow-citizens to
order their lifes after his own example . . .and in all that mass
of authorities which bear upon this law (of the reasonable
man) there is no single mention of the reasonable woman." 30
The courts have gone to unusual pains to emphasize the ab-
stract character of this mythical person. He is not to be identi-
fied with any ordinary individual who might occasionally do
unreasonable things. He is a prudent and careful man who is
always up to standard.31 Nor is it proper to identify him with
any member of the jury which is to apply the standard. He is
rather a personification of a community ideal of reasonable be-
havior, determined by the jury's social judgment.8 2
The conduct of the reasonable man will vary with the situa-
tion with which he is confronted. "It would appear that there is
no standardized man; that there is only in part an objective test;
that there is no such thing as reasonable or unreasonable con-
duct except as viewed with reference to certain qualities of the
actor-his physical attributes and his intellectual powers."
33
The physical characteristics of the reasonable man may be said
to be identical with those of the actor.
23 Prosser, William L., Handbook of the Law of Torts, p. 223 (1st Ed., 1941).
29 Cardozo, C. J., Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N. Y. 14, 164 N. E.
726, 727 (1928).
30 Herbert, A. P., Misleading Cases in the Common Law, 12-16 (1930).
31 Reynolds v. City of Burlington, 52 Vt. 300, 308 (1880).
32 Freeman v. Adams, 63 Cal. App. 225, 218 P. 600 (1923).
3 Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective, Harv. L. R. 1, 27 (1927).
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In terms of tort law, premenstrual tension, with its periodic
hypoglycemia and abnormal fluid retention (both involuntary
dysfunctions over which the victim has no control) is analogous
to a physical disability or defect. Physical disability is incapacity
caused by physical defects or infirmities, or bodily imperfec-
tions, or mental weakness, and it may be temporary.3 4 Disability
may result as well from the condition of the mind and nerves as
from other causes.35
What standard of conduct is required of a person with a
physical disability? In Hill v. City of Glenwood,36 the court said:
"The streets are for the use of the general public without
discrimination; for the weak, the lame, the halt and the
blind, as well as for those possessing perfect health, strength,
and vision. The law casts upon one no greater burden of
care than upon the other."
The court then went on to say there is no fixed rule for de-
termining what is ordinary care applicable to all cases, but that
each case must be determined according to its own facts. Here,
the plaintiff's blindness is simply one of the facts which the
jury must consider in finding whether he did or did not act
with the care which a reasonably prudent man would ordinarily
exercise when burdened by such an infirmity.
In discussing the standard of care required of a member of
"the weaker sex," in Hassenyer v. Michigan Central R. Co.,
Justice Cooley said:
"Women may enter upon and follow any of the occupations
of life; they may be a surgeon if they will, but they cannot
claim any privilege of exemption from the care and caution
required of men. A woman may be engineer of a locomotive
if she can obtain the employment, but the law will expect
and require of her the same diligence to avoid mischief to
others which men must observe. The rule of prudent re-
gard for the rights of others knows nothing of sex....
"But no doubt also the law ought under all circum-
stances where they become important, to make allowances
for any differences existing by nature between men and
women." 
37
The reasonable woman (Mr. A. P. Herbert notwithstanding)
would be most reluctant to ask special privileges for functions
34 Black's Law Dictionary, 548 (4th ed., 1951).
35 U. S. v. Taylor, 110 F. 2d, 132, 134 (1940).
36 124 Iowa 479, 100 N. W. 522 (1904).
87 48 Mich. 205, 12 N. W. 155 (1882).
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which by nature's whim she is obligated and normally proud to
perform. But on the other hand, in all justice the reasonable
woman is also reluctant to be penalized for dysfunctions which
by nature's whim she is unable to control. At the risk of being
accused of prejudice, this writer is in complete accord with
Justice Cooley's contention that the law should make allow-
ances for any differences existing by nature between men and
women. It is interesting to contemplate what reaction might be
registered by the learned judge if he found words uttered by
him in 1882 quoted in defense of the acceptance of premenstrual
tension as a legal fact in 1957.
The reader will recall that it was pointed out above that
one of the interesting aspects of premenstrual tension is the
patient's frequent failure to realize the medical basis of her
problem, thereby being unprepared to take adequate safety
precautions for her standard of conduct during this period. An
automobile driven by a woman who unknowingly suffers from
the severest symptoms of premenstrual tension would be a
dramatic example of "the accident looking for some place to
happen." 38
From the legal standpoint, to what extent would the driver
be responsible for damages resulting from this type of situa-
tion? In Cohen v. Petty, 9 the defendant became suddenly ill,
and lost consciousness and control of the car which he was driv-
ing, thereby causing injury to the plaintiff. The court held:
"One who is suddenly stricken by an illness, which he had
no reason to anticipate while driving an automobile, which
renders it impossible for him to control the car, is not
chargeable with negligence."
But one who knows of his own condition (i.e., an epileptic)
may be guilty of criminal negligence in driving a car.40
Slattery v. Haley,41 is a leading case in support of the theory
that a defendant cannot be found negligent for committing an
act which was the proximate result of an unanticipated illness.
Here, without any preliminary symptoms, the defendant be-
came unexpectedly ill and lost consciousness while driving his
38 See n. 23, above.
89 65 F. 2d 820 (App., D. C., 1933).
40 N. Y. Penal L., Sec. 1503-a; and cases cited in Oleck, 1 NCS 41 (1955).
But see below, at n. 44.
41 3 Dom. L. Rep. 156, 25 Ont. L. Rep. 95 (1923).
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car. The automobile ran up on the sidewalk and killed the
plaintiff's son. The defendant was absolved of liability.
The court said: 
42
"Does the sudden illness which overcame him excuse him
from the failure to discharge that duty (to operate the car
with due care) or is his duty so absolute as to render him
liable even though his failure arises from something he had
no power to anticipate, was powerless to prevent? It is
singular how little law can be found dealing with the ques-
tion .... I think that it may now be regarded as settled law
that to create liability for an act which is not wilful and
intentional but merely negligent, it must be shown to have
been the conscious act of the defendant's volition. He must
have done that which he ought not to have done, or omitted
that which he ought to have done as a conscious being. Fail-
ing this the occurrence is a 'mere accident,' a 'pure accident'
or, as is often but not accurately put, 'an inevitable acci-
dent.' "
In Armstrong v. Cook,43 the plaintiff was a guest in an
automobile driven by her daughter. The evidence disclosed that
the driver was "tired and worn out." While crossing an inter-
section she lost consciousness or fainted, thus losing control of
the car, which collided with a pole. The Supreme Court of
Michigan held:
"Where sole proximate cause of automobile striking pole was
driver's fainting or losing consciousness, guest passenger
could not recover damages for injuries received; fainting or
losing consciousness not being actionable for negligence."
Judge Lee E. Skeel of the Ohio Court of Appeals, writing
the opinion in Weldon Tool Co. v. Kelley,4 4 said:
"By the great weight of authority one who becomes suddenly
stricken or loses consciousness due to an unforeseen cause,
while driving an automobile, and as a proximate cause there-
of injures another, cannot be charged with negligence under
such circumstances." (Italics added.)
Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice
(Volume I, Sec. 656) states the following rule:
"Fainting or momentary loss of consciousness by the driver
of an automobile, due to fatigue, is not in itself actionable
negligence, and, if a driver stricken by paralysis or seized
42 Ibid., 25 Ont. L. Rep. p. 99.
43 250 Mich. 180, 229 N. W. 433 (1930).
44 81 Ohio App. 427, 76 N. E. 2d 632 (1947). Judge Skeel also is President
of Cleveland-Marshall Law School. See also, Harrington v. H. D. Lee
Mercantile Co., 97 Mont. 40, 33 P. 2d 533 (1934).
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by an epileptic fit still continues with his hand on the wheel
of an automobile while he is driving, and unconscious so
directs it as to cause its collision with another, he cannot
be held negligent for the way in which he controls it."
Not so, of course, if he knew of his epileptic condition, as is
pointed out above.
This writer has no hesitancy in agreeing that there are few
ordinary agencies so fraught with danger to life and property
as an automobile proceeding upon the highway freed from the
direction of a conscious mind. For the sake of fairness, let us
consider the other side of our hypothetical situation involving
a car driven by a woman suffering from premenstrual tension.
Under the facts to be considered now, the woman is aware that
she has monthly symptoms of physical and mental maladjust-
ments. With knowledge of her disability, is the woman guilty of
negligence or contributory negligence if she attempts to drive
a car?
American Jurisprudence (Volume 5, Sec. 178) gives the
following rule:
"The fact that one has a physical defect will not, in itself,
render him liable for an injury resulting from the operation
of an automobile, or prevent his recovery for an injury
where the defect is not such as to render the operation of the
car by him negligence. It is usually a jury question of fact
in each case."
"The circumstances that one is subject to vertigo or
other illness will not serve to make him contributorily neg-
ligent in his use of the public thoroughfares." 4 5
"Evidence of any physical defect or illness existing at
the time of the accident upon the part of either the motorist
or pedestrian is admissible at the trial. Respecting the
motorist, such evidence is pertinent upon the issue as to
whether due care was exercised in the operation of the
vehicle while he was so disabled or affected, and to what
extent, if any, such factor contributed to the accident." 46
The general rule is that the fact that the operator of a motor
vehicle which became involved in an automobile accident has
some physical defect will not in itself render him liable as a
45 See, Woodson v. Metropolitan Street R. Co., 224 Mo. 685, 123 S. W. 820(1909); and McGee v. Jones County, 161 Iowa 296, 142 N. W. 957; 5 Am.
Jur., Sec. 469. But see above, n. 38, statute on epilepsy and the cases cited
in 1 NCS 41 (1955).
46 5 Am. Jur., Sec. 635.
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matter of law, but may properly be taken into consideration by
the trier of facts in determining the question of negligence.47
The only annotation in any legal periodical mentioning
automobile accident in relationship to the menstrual period was
found in 28 ALR 2d which said:
"Testimony to the effect that the driver of the car during her
menstrual period became unconscious without warning
while driving in a careful way was held to authorize a ver-
dict for the defendant in Edwards v. Ford, 1943, 69 Ga.
App. 578, 26 S. E. 2d 306."
This case is not being emphasized too strongly, because a study
of the facts disclosed that the primary defense of the defendant
was not based on the premenstrual tension.
The writer has personal knowledge of another case involv-
ing a young girl of sixteen who periodically had behavior prob-
lems absolutely inconsistent with her normal pattern of be-
havior. The father, finally suspecting an association of her ab-
normal behavior with her monthly menstrual period, referred
the girl to Professor Oleck and Morton. By a series of blood
tests, vaginal smears, and other tests it was determined that she
suffered from a severe case of premenstrual tension. During
one of her periodic behavior lapses, the young lady participated
in the stealing and driving of an automobile which became in-
volved in an accident. Professor Oleck referred the girl's par-
ents to William L. Prosser, Dean of the Law School, University
of California. The California Juvenile Court which handled the
case released the defendant in the supervision of an attorney
suggested by Dean Prosser and a physician who was to give
medical treatment for the girl's temporary disability. Because
the legal action was taken in a Juvenile Court, there is no avail-
able record of the proceedings. For obvious personal reasons
the names of the parties involved cannot be revealed.
At the present time there is no adequate provision of legal
principles and rules to govern the use of premenstrual tension
as a defense. But members of the legal profession are urged to
view the inevitable necessity and possibility of such a defense
with an open mind. To the medical profession premenstrual ten-
sion is a settled scientific fact. The realistic lawyer should ap-
preciate that the law cannot indefinitely ignore the scientific
facts of life.
47 Anno., 28 A. L. R. 2d 27, cf. Williams v. Husted, 39 Ohio 589, 54 N. E.
2d 165 (1943).
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Could any attorney reasonably conclude that a woman's
conduct should be considered negligent if such conduct was
caused by a mental and physical disability of which she had no
specific knowledge or over which she had no conscious control?
Even if the woman is cognizant of the existence of premenstrual
tension with its concomitant physical and mental effects, how
is she to determine the extent to which these symptoms may
develop? When does the defendant's conduct become unreason-
able in the light of the risk which she is undertaking? Is it to
be presumed that any woman suffering from premenstrual ten-
sion and having knowledge of it should, for instance, abandon
the driving of an automobile? Against the probability of risk
must be balanced the inconvenience and unreasonableness of
demanding that a woman cease driving for ten to fourteen days
of each month in anticipation of a risk which may never be
realized. No person can be expected to guard indefinitely
against events which cannot be reasonably anticipated.
The problems created by this common syndrome are infinite,
varied, and complex. Remembering that premenstrual tension
may be a matter of objective evidence which can be verified by
scientific tests after the event as well as before, it behooves
every attorney who is handling a case in which a female is in-
volved, to investigate a possible connection between his client's
legal problem and premenstrual tension. Until legislation or the
cases build up a body of law dealing directly with the subject,
it is imperative that the conscientious attorney give serious con-
sideration to the acceptance of severe premenstrual tension as
a modern legal fact.
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